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I extend McCabe’s distinction between perfective and imperfective learning and show 
how this addresses the Omniscience Sophism. 
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McCabe identifies a crucial ambiguity in the terms ‘learns’ and ‘knows’. Such terms can 
be read as either ‘perfective’ or ‘imperfective’ (McCabe 2018, secs. 5–6). This is an 
aspect difference. The former indicates a settled state, the latter a directed process. 
McCabe uses this insight to show how Socrates can rebut the sophist’s view of meaning, 
render compelling Socrates’ self-refutation arguments, and explain the Socratic 
connections between learning, knowledge, and how one should live.  
 However, the Euthydemus wrestles with another logico-linguistic feature of 
‘knows’ and ‘learns’: they are relative terms (Euthydemus 293b7-d1; Cf. Parmenides 
134a1–b1). Just as a father is father of an offspring (Euthydemus 298b7–d9), so a knower 
knows the knowable. In the final section of the Euthydemus, Euthydemus offers the 
‘Omniscience Sophism’, and the related, rather cheeky, ‘Father Sophisms’.  
 McCabe suggests that the Omniscience Sophism might be addressed by 
identifying an aspect ambiguity, but does not follow up her point in detail (McCabe 2018, 
sec. 7). In this response, I argue that McCabe’s instinct is good and that a relative term, 
such as ‘knowledgeable’, can be understood as having two senses. That distinction is 
between what I call ‘fine-grained’ and ‘coarse-grained’ senses of ‘knowledgeable’. I 
suggest that this distinction that tracks McCabe’s aspect distinction between senses of 
‘learns’ and best explains the fallacy committed in the Omniscience Sophism.  
 
Aspects and Knowledge  
 
There are two ways to understand a statement like ‘Socrates is knowledgeable’. On one 
reading, Socrates is knowledgeable because Socrates knows some specific thing, such as 
Pythagoras’ theorem. On this reading, Socrates’ knowledge is fine-grained because 
Socrates’ knowledge relates only to a specific object. On another reading, Socrates is 
knowledgeable because he has expertise in a general domain, such as geometry. On this 
reading, Socrates’ knowledge is coarse-grained because Socrates’ knowledge relates to a 
generic object, geometry. Knowledge of geometry, of course, is not maximally coarse-
grained. If Socrates’ knowledge were maximally coarse-grained knowledge, Socrates’ 
knowledge would relate to an item as generic as the knowable.  
McCabe briefly alludes to the Omniscience Sophism in her paper. When 
discussing cases of aspect ambiguity she says ‘perhaps the thing in question is a general 
property, such as being knowledgeable, and the change of aspect in the verb “learn” 
reflects differences in the ways and extents to which we possess the property 
“knowledgeable”’ (McCabe 2018, sec. 7). She then invites us to compare the sophists’ 
arguments at 293ff. The coarse-grained/fine-grained distinction tracks McCabe’s aspect 
distinction. If Socrates is knowledgeable in a coarse-grained way, his learning is 
complete, and he is in the settled state of being knowledgeable. For example, if Socrates 
has coarse-grained knowledge of geometry, he has the sort systematic expertise in 
geometry that arrives at the end of the learning process. But if Socrates is knowledgeable 
is a fine-grained way, he only knows certain bits of geometry, such as Pythagoras’ 
theorem. His learning is not complete. Fine-grained knowledge corresponds to 
imperfective learning while coarse-grained knowledge corresponds to perfective 
learning.1  
Ignoring the difference between fine-grained knowledge and coarse-grained 
knowledge leads to the Omniscience Sophisms. The sophists exploit the ambiguity in 
expressions like ‘Socrates is knowledgeable’ to argue that if Socrates knows anything, 
Socrates knows everything. Socrates tries to make the Sophists respect the fine-
grained/coarse-grained distinction (Euthydemus 293b), without success.  
  
 
1 In an earlier draft of this reply, I mistakenly wrote that fine-grained knowledge relates 
to perfective learning and coarse-grained knowledge to imperfective learning. Thanks to 
MM for pointing out my error.  
 
The Omniscience Sophism in the Euthydemus 
 
The proof of my claim that Plato distinguishes fine-grained and coarse-grained senses 
‘knowlegeable’ will be that it best explains the text and argument of the Omniscience 
Sophism. In particular, my distinction better accounts for the text than the traditional 
reading of the sophism as a formal fallacy, the secundum quid. We also need to look 
globally at this argument and the hints that the text provides to determine how Plato 
thinks these sophisms might be dealt with.2  
 The Omniscience Sophism (293b7-d1) occurs in the final ‘dialectical display’ 
section of the Euthydemus. Socrates has fallen into difficulty giving an account of the 
‘knowledge we ought to have if we are going to spend the remainder of our lives in the 
right way’ (293a4–6). He asks the brothers for help with this question, and Euthydemus 
offers something better: to show that Socrates already has the knowledge he seeks, 
because he already knows everything! The key term in this sophism is ‘knowledge’, a 
term which Plato flags as a relative elsewhere (e.g. Parmenides 134a1–b1). As we will 
see, this is no accident. Euthydemus begins his demonstration this way: 
 
T1 Euthydemus 293b7-c1. 
 
Come then and answer me, he said: is there something that you know? 
Oh yes, I said, many things, small ones at any rate. 
 
2 This is very much the method suggested by (McCabe 2005, 107–9).  
That’s enough, he said. Do you think that it is possible for some being not to be 
the very thing that it in fact is?3  
 No, by Zeus, not I! 
 
After agreeing that he knows some small things, Socrates agrees that it is not possible 
that some thing is not the very thing that it is: 
 
(EUT) For all x it is not possible that x is what x is and x is not what x is.4 
 
Euthydemus formulates what looks like a version the principle of non-contradiction 
(PNC), but there is something odd about it. What Euthydemus formulates seems 
ambiguous between: 
 
(EUT’) For all x, it is not possible that (x is identical to x and x is not identical to x) 
 
 and  
 
(EUT’’) For all x and all F, it is not possible that (x is F and x is not F) 
 
 
3 δοκεῖς οἷόν τέ τι τῶν ὄντων τοῦτο ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μὴ εἶναι; 
4 Elsewhere McCabe calls this the ‘gross principle of non–contradiction’ (McCabe 2005, 
114).   
 
The first of these is obviously true; the second is obviously false. EUT’ truly asserts that 
a thing cannot be identical to itself and also not identical to itself: nothing can fail to be 
identical to itself, so EUT’ is true. EUT’’ falsely asserts that a thing cannot have a feature 
and lack that feature: a thing can have a feature in some respect and lack that feature in 
another respect. Maybe Euthydemus formulates the principle ambiguously on purpose. 
An interlocutor may endorse EUT thinking they are committed to the true EUT’, but a 
sophist may argue as if the interlocutor is committed to the false EUT’’.   
Euthydemus has more tricks afoot. Applied to the case of being knowledgeable, 
EUT yields that it is not possible that someone is knowledgeable and not knowledgeable. 
But we can already see that, in the case of relatives, something fishy is going on. Plato is 
very clear that every relative has a correlative.5 Generally, Plato’s discussions of relative-
correlative pairs use a stable terminology. Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is a common example 
of a relative term for Plato, and knowledge always has a correlative. This makes sense, 
since knowledge is knowledge of some knowable thing.6 Given EUT, the knower is 
knowledgeable and so the knower knows something. But ‘the knower knows something’ 
is ambiguous. Is there something specific that the knower knows, say, Pythagoras’ 
 
5 For example: Charmides 167c–168c; Parmenides 133c–134a; Republic 438b–e; 
Symposium 199d–200a; Theaetetus152a–c. Cf. Aristotle, Categories 6a36–8b24.  
6  Cf. Charmides 167c; Parmenides 133a-134a; Parmenides 142a. Aristotle coins a term 
for the correlative of knowledge, ‘knowable’ (Categories 7), but Plato prefers natural 
language, even if it is not quite consistent. For further discussion of knowledge as a 
relative in Plato see my (Duncombe 2013). 
theorem? Or does the knower just know something or other and it doesn’t matter what?7 
The former sense of ‘the knower knows something’ is the fine-grained sense, the latter 
the coarse-grained sense. The fine-grained sense of ‘the knower knows something’ 
foregrounds what the knower knows. The coarse-grained sense foregrounds the fact that 
the knower is knowledgeable.  
 But, just as the brothers exploit perfective/imperfective ambiguities, they exploit 
fine-grained/coarse-grained ambiguities, as we will now see. 
 
 (T2) Euthydemus 293c1-d1 
Do you know something? 
I do. 
Therefore, you are knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων), if you know? 
Yes, about that actual thing at any rate (Πάνυ γε, τούτου γε αὐτοῦ). 
It makes no difference: but isn’t it necessary that you know everything, if you are 
knowledgeable? 
 By Zeus, I exclaimed, there are many other things that I don’t know.  
 Then if you don’t know something, you are not knowledgeable. 
 About that, at any rate, my friend, I said.  
 So are you less not–knowledgeable because of that? And just now you said that 
you are knowledgeable: and in this way it turns out that you both are the man who 
you are and again you are not the man who you are with regard to the same things 
at the same time (κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἅμα).  
 
7 This distinction is drawn by (Quine 1956). 
 
In (T2) the sophist tries to catch Socrates in a dilemma:  
 
1. Socrates knows something iff Socrates is knowledgeable.   [Premise] 
2. Socrates knows something      [Premise] 
3. Socrates does not know something     [Premise] 
4. Socrates is knowledgeable      [MP on 1,2] 
5. Socrates is not knowledgeable      [MP on 1,3] 
6. Socrates is knowledgeable and not knowledgeable   [&-introduction 4,6] 
7. So, Socrates is who he is and not who he is with regard to the same things at the 
same time.       [Violates EUT] 
        
As I construe it, the argument starts with a biconditional (1). Socrates has an explicitly 
relational attribute, knowing something, just in case Socrates has an implicitly relational 
attribute, being knowledgeable. Socrates admits that knowing is an attribute of him, at 
(2), but struggles to get Euthydemus to acknowledge that he is knowledgeable only about 
some specific thing. Socrates has admitted that he knows in the fine-grained sense, and 
tries to insist that this commits him to being knowledgeable only in that sense and not 
also in the coarse-grained sense. But Euthydemus pushes this subtlety aside, which is 
evidence that the fine-grained/coarse-grained distinction could address the sophism. 
Euthydemus then asks Socrates to admit that if Socrates is knowledgeable, 
Socrates knows everything. Socrates denies this, as there are some things Socrates does 
not know. Again, Socrates here seems to be concerned to take ‘knows’ in the fine-grained 
sense. There are many specific things that Socrates does not know, as (3) asserts. Again, 
Euthydemus brushes aside the clarification. Again, this is evidence that the distinction 
could solve the sophism.  
It is straightforward to get from these premises to the admission that Socrates is 
knowledgeable and not knowledgeable. But Euthydemus leaps to a surprising conclusion. 
Euthydemus concludes that Socrates is both who he is and a not who he is ‘with regard to 
the same thing at the same time’, which violates EUT. This is a further reason to think 
that the fine-grained/coarse-grained distinction is in play. Euthydemus tries to trap 
Socrates with EUT. One way out of the dilemma would be for Socrates to say that he is a 
knower in relation to something and not a knower in relation to another. This would be to 
opt for a fine-grained sense of ‘knower’. Socrates is a knower in relation to Pythagoras’ 
theorem, but not in relation to squaring the circle.  
Euthydemus tries to close this escape route when he re-states EUT in the 
conclusion. The PNC, as Plato commonly formulates it, specifies that an item cannot 
have different properties (a) in the same respect (κατὰ ταὐτά) (b) at the same time (ἅμα) 
and (c) in relation to the same thing (πρός ταὐτόν). EUT as presented at 293c8–d1 is 
almost identical to the PNC presented at Republic 436b9–c2, except that one of the 
qualifiers is omitted in the Euthydemus version, namely the πρός ταὐτόν qualification.8  
Without this qualification, Socrates cannot easily expose the fine-grained/coarse-
grained ambiguity. Even if he were to respond that he is a knower in relation to 
Pythagoras’ theorem but not in relation to squaring the circle, he would still violate EUT. 
After all, Socrates admits that he has opposite features, being a knower and a non-
 
8 For further discussion of relatives in this passage, see my (Duncombe 2015).   
knower, at the same time, and in the same respect. And with EUT formulated as it is, this 
is enough to show that he both is what he is and not what he is. Euthydemus concludes 
that Socrates both is the man he is and is not the man he is.  
The fine-grained/coarse-grained distinction would, in fact, defuse the sophism. 
Armed with the distinction, we can see that the fallacy comes in a shift in meaning. (2) is 
true only when ‘knows’ is taken fine-grained. Socrates knows some specific thing; 
Socrates does not know the maximally generic thing. Since (4) derives from (2), (4) 
should also take ‘knowledgeable’ in a fine-grained way. But the conjunction of (4) and 
(5) is only problematic if ‘knowledgeable’ in (4) — and (5) — is taken in a coarse-
grained way. Otherwise, Socrates could simply know Pythagoras’ theorem but not the 
proof that there are exactly five Platonic solids. If ‘knows’ is read consistently as fine-
grained, the premises are true, but Socrates simply knows some things and does not know 
others: no contradiction there.  
 This reading is confirmed by Socrates’ reiteration and extension of Euthydemus’ 
argument. Even though this argument commits a fallacy, all that has been argued so far is 
that Socrates cannot be both a knower and not a knower, not that he is omniscient. 
Socrates sarcastically draws out that consequence at 239d:9  
   
(T3) But how do I have the knowledge we were looking for? Since it is 
impossible both to be and not to be the same thing, if I know one thing I know 
absolutely everything — because I could not be knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων) and 
not knowledgeable (ἀνεπιστήμων) at the same time — and since I know 
 
9 (Sprage 1962, 23); (Hawtrey, 1981, 140–42); (Chance 1992, 133); (Jansen 2006, 3). 
everything, I also have this knowledge. Is that what you mean, and is this your 
piece of wisdom? (Euthydemus 293d3-8. Trans Sprague, modified). 
 
Here is a reconstruction of this argument: 
 
1. It is impossible to be both the same thing and not that thing [Premise] 
2. Socrates cannot be knowledgeable and not knowledgeable at the same time 
      [Instance of 1] 
3. |Socrates is knowledgeable about x    [Supposition] 
4. |Socrates is knowledgeable     [From 3] 
5. |So, it is not the case that Socrates is not knowledgeable [From 4] 
6. |So, there is nothing Socrates does not know   [From 5] 
7. If Socrates is knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων), then Socrates knows everything 
       [conditional intro 3–6] 
8. Socrates is knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων)   [Premise] 
9. So, Socrates knows everything.    [MP 7,8] 
 
The argument fails to motivate its conclusion, for there are many people who know some 
things, but do not know everything, a point pursued at length (Euthydemus 294a–295a). 
The obvious solution would be to reject (7). It is just not true that if Socrates is 
knowledgeable, Socrates knows everything. However, there is some reasoning behind 
premise (7), which I have construed as a (3)–(6) above. If Socrates turns out not to know 
some bit of knowledge, Socrates turns out to be not knowledgeable. So, if Socrates is 
knowledgeable, there is no bit of knowledge which Socrates lacks.  
Socrates immediately identifies what is wrong with this argument: if Socrates 
knows something, Socrates need not be knowledgeable full stop. The moves from (3) to 
(4) and (5) to (6) are illicit. Many commentators claim that this is an instance of the 
secundum quid fallacy.10 That is, the fallacy arises when we take a qualified attribution to 
follow from an unqualified one, or an unqualified attribution to follow from a qualified 
one.   
Alone, the secundum quid diagnosis is unsatisfactory. First, as McCabe has 
pointed out in earlier work, the sophism here was presented before any formal 
classifications of fallacies existed.11 So, even though Aristotle originally identified the 
secundum quid fallacy at Sophistical Refutations 166b28–36, to argue that Plato or 
Plato’s Socrates has a possible reply to the sophisms, one must rely on an analysis of the 
fallacy that Plato could have given. Second, simply identifying the argument as a 
secundum quid does not much help Socrates campaign against the brothers, as it does not 
give Socrates a principled way to diagnose what has gone wrong. Indeed, identifying the 
fallacy as a secundum quid out of line with Socrates’ general approach to debunking the 
fallacies in the Euthydemus. At 277e5, Socrates encourages Clineas to learn Prodicus’ 
skill of the ‘correctness of names’ to solve the sophisms. This suggests that, rather than 
the formal fallacy of adding or removing qualifiers, we should be looking for a fallacy of 
 
10 See Buridan’s Summulae de Dialectica 7.4.2.  
11 (McCabe 2005, 110). 
ambiguity. Moreover, diagnosing as a secundum quid fallacy is uninformative. We learn 
nothing about the Socratic idea of knowledge with such a diagnosis. 
 We can now see that there are some desiderata on a persuasive reading of this 
passage, based on the criticisms I have levelled at the secundum quid reading of the 
sophism. First, whatever analysis we choose, there is across–the–board agreement that 
Socrates is presented as being aware that the sophism is a fallacy with a solution.12 We 
would like any solution to be one that Plato’s Socrates could have given. Second, we 
know the general shape of that solution should be in term of an ambiguity, rather than a 
formal fallacy, concerned with the addition or removal of qualifying expressions. Finally, 
in line with McCabe’s project, how we resolve the fallacies should tell us something 
about knowledge and learning, not just about refuting fallacies. 
This distinction between fine- and coarse-grained readings of ‘knowledgeable’ 
helps us meet these desiderata. Where Socrates is knowledgeable, under the fine-grained 
reading, Socrates knows some specific object of knowledge, say Pythagoras’ theorem. 
Under this analysis, from the fact that Socrates knows something, we can infer only that 
Socrates is knowledgeable about that thing. This is simply because ‘Socrates knows 
something’, under the fine-grained reading, means that Socrates knows something 
specific. So it is true that Socrates knows something.  
But, the move from ‘Socrates is knowledgeable’, understood as fine-grained, to 
‘Socrates knows everything’ is not legitimate: the object of fine-grained knowledge is not 
‘everything’, but merely the specific object of knowledge, say Pythagoras’ theorem. So 
we cannot legitimately conclude that Socrates knows everything from the fact that 
 
12 (Canto 1989, 217); (Hawtrey, 1981, 141); (McCabe 2005). 
Socrates is knowledgeable, because the fine-grained reading of ‘knows’ does not require 
that knowledge be of everything. Knowledge, in this sense, can merely be of one or more 
specific domains or items. This does not, of course, rule out that knowledge could be of 
everything; it merely rules out that being in a state of knowledge entails knowledge of 
everything. 
This meets our first desideratum, since Plato could have given this analysis. It 
meets the second because it explains the fallacy in terms of an ambiguity. The ambiguity 
is between ‘knowledgeable’, understood in a fine-grained sense and ‘knowledgeable’ 
understood in a coarse-grained sense. Socrates can be ‘knowing’ in the sense of being in 
a fine-grained state of knowing, in virtue of knowing something like Pythagoras’ 
theorem. But this is consistent with Socrates not knowing something else in a fine-
grained sense, since he lacks an intentional state directed towards some knowable thing. 
On the other hand, if we disambiguate with coarse-grained sense of ‘knowledgeable’, 
Euthydemus seems right: Socrates cannot be knowledgeable about the knowable as a 
whole and also not knowledgeable as a whole.  
Furthermore, EUT, the deviant Principle of Non-Contradiction, gives a reason to 
think that the disambiguation between fine- and coarse-grained senses of 
‘knowledgeable’ is at stake. Euthydemus omits the relational qualification from the PNC 
to block a response to the sophism, a response which Socrates attempts. Specifically, the 
response that Socrates knows some things and not some others: when ‘knows’ is taken in 
a fine-grained way, it is perfectly true and harmless that Socrates knows some things and 
not others. The deviant PNC, however, is true only if ‘knows’ is understood in a coarse-
grained way. If ‘knows’ is coarse-grained, then ‘Socrates knows’ means ‘Socrates knows 
the knowable’, while Socrates ‘Socrates does not know’ means ‘Socrates does not know 
the knowable’. In either case, the object is a generic one, the knowable. The relational 
qualification is moot: coarse-grained knowledge only relates to the knowable, so can be 
bracketed. At least, Euthydemus thinks so. 
Finally, my suggestion that the Omniscience Sophism can be solved by 
distinguishing fine- and coarse-grained senses of knowledge connects with the Socratic 
thought about how we acquire expertise. The sophists assume that being knowledgeable 
is a maximally coarse-grained. This makes being knowledgeable an all or nothing affair: 
either the subject is knowledgeable about the knowable as a whole or the subject is not 
knowledgeable at all. Socrates, in exposing the Omniscience Sophism, shows that one 
can be knowledgeable in a fine-grained way: a knower can know part of the knowable 
domain, without knowing it as a whole. This leaves open the door not only for expertise, 
being knowledgeable, but also for learning to be knowledgeable: fine-grained and coarse-
grained knowledge are on a continuum. So resolving the fallacies as I have suggested 
doesn’t just tell us something about how to avoid fallacies; it tells us something about the 




One way to understand Plato’s Euthydemus is as a catalogue of sophisms, with Platonic 
hints a how to solve them: a sort of inchoate Sophistical Refutations. Another way, which 
McCabe has reinvigorated, is to view the Euthydemus as a deeply Socratic conversation, 
concerned with how we learn to be virtuous and, above all, knowledgeable. My response 
has suggested how McCabe’s distinction between perfective and imperfective aspects of 
learning can be extended to coarse- and fine-grained aspects of knowledge. This latter 
distinction can offer a satisfying explanation of the text of the Omniscience Sophism. 
Furthermore, unlike the uniform, coarse-grained knowledge of the brothers, the 
distinction between fine-grained and coarse-grained knowledge can help Socrates make 




It is my great pleasure to offer this response to a wonderful paper by MM McCabe, from 
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